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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this civil rights action, real estate developer Whiteland 
Woods, L.P., a subsidiary of Toll Brothers, asserts that its 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by a 
township's refusal to allow videotaping of a meeting of the 
Township Planning Commission. In a parallel state court 
action, the township acknowledged that Pennsylvania's 
Sunshine Act, 65 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 271-86 (West Supp. 
1998), requires the township to allow videotaping of 
Planning Commission proceedings and agreed not to 
enforce the ban at future meetings. Whiteland Woods then 
filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West 1994) 
seeking monetary damages and attorney's fees. The District 
Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 




On June 24, 1996, Whiteland Woods filed a tentative 
application with West Whiteland Township, Chester 
County, to build a residential community on a 162.5-acre 
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parcel in the township. The application was placed on the 
agenda for the September 25, 1996 meeting of the West 
Whiteland Planning Commission. 
 
At the September 25 meeting, attorney Thomas A. Riley 
presented Whiteland Woods' application to the Planning 
Commission. Whiteland Woods had arranged for a video 
camera operator to attend the meeting and record the 
proceedings. Apparently in response to this videotaping, 
Township Solicitor John D. Snyder stated early in the 
meeting that he intended to discuss rules governing 
videotaping, but that any changes to the rules would apply 
only to future meetings. During the meeting, Snyder 
prepared a resolution barring the use of all video cameras 
at future Planning Commission meetings. The resolution 
provided in part: "The following rules shall govern the use 
of mechanical/electrical recording and/or stenographic 
devices during public meetings: . . . (5) No video taping or 
video recording and no additional lighting shall be 
employed." 
 
Jack Newell, president of the Planning Commission, 
placed Snyder's resolution on the agenda and Snyder 
presented it at the end of the meeting. Members of the 
Planning Commission discussed the proposed resolution, 
with participation by Riley and Michael Greenberg, vice 
president of Toll Brothers. Newell explained that he believed 
videotaping would inhibit candid discussion by township 
residents. Other members of the Planning Commission 
expressed resentment at being videotaped and stated that 
videotaping could be intimidating. Greenberg, on the other 
hand, said he wanted a video record of all proceedings and 
Riley informed the Commission that he believed allowing 
videotaping was required by Pennsylvania's Sunshine Act. 
Nevertheless, the Planning Commission adopted the 
resolution banning videotaping by a vote of four to two. The 
Planning Commission did not prevent Whiteland Woods 
from videotaping the September 25 meeting. 
 
On October 4, 1996, counsel for Whiteland Woods sent 
the Planning Commission written notification of Whiteland 
Woods' intention to videotape a meeting scheduled for 
October 9, 1996. On October 8, 1996, Snyder wrote 
informing Whiteland Woods that the Township would not 
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permit videotaping and stating, "Under the circumstances, 
if you decide to undertake the effort and expense of 
bringing video cameras and videotaping equipment to the 
meeting you must do so at your own risk . . . ." The same 
day, the township's Board of Supervisors, following the lead 
of the Planning Commission, enacted Resolution 96-10 
banning the use of video recording devices at meetings of 
the Board of Supervisors. Resolution 96-10 provided in 
part: "The following regulations shall govern the use of 
electrical/mechanical recording equipment during public 
meetings of the Board: . . . (c) Only audio recording or 
stenographic recording equipment may be used i.e. no video 
recording equipment shall be permitted . . . ." 
 
Representatives of Whiteland Woods brought video 
recording equipment to the Planning Commission's October 
9, 1996 meeting, but Officer John Curran of the West 
Whiteland Township Police Department informed Whiteland 
Woods' representatives they could not make a video 
recording of the meeting. Accordingly, Whiteland Woods left 
the camera facing the wall and made no videotape of the 
meeting. 
 
On October 14, 1996, Whiteland Woods filed suit in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, seeking 
injunctive relief and relief under the Pennsylvania 
Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 7531-41 (West 1998), for violating the Sunshine Act, 65 
Pa. Stat. Ann. S 271-86. Whiteland Woods also sought a 
preliminary injunction barring the Township from enforcing 
the two resolutions. On October 16, 1996, the Township, 
through counsel, wrote to the Court of Common Pleas 
conceding the Township could not enforce either resolution, 
citing Hain v. Board of Sch. Directors, 641 A.2d 661, 663-64 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (holding that the Sunshine Act 
requires Pennsylvania government agencies to permit 
videotaping of their meetings). The Township defendants 
waived their right to a hearing on the preliminary 
injunction and the Court of Common Pleas on October 17 
enjoined the Township from enforcing or attempting to 
enforce the two resolutions or any other resolutions 
prohibiting the videotaping of public meetings. The Board of 
Supervisors and Planning Commission complied with the 
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injunction and did not try to enforce the resolutions. In 
fact, Whiteland Woods has videotaped every Board of 
Supervisors meeting since October 22, 1996. 
 
Whiteland Woods then sought additional relief, filing a 
suit in the Court of Common Pleas for Chester County on 
November 13, 1996 for alleged violations of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C.A. S 1983 (West 
1994), the Pennsylvania Constitution, and Pennsylvania's 
Sunshine Act. The complaint sought damages in excess of 
$2,100,000 and attorney's fees.1 The Township removed the 
case to federal court and filed a third-party complaint 
against Snyder, alleging that he advised the Commission 
that it legally could adopt the resolution barring 
videotaping. The Planning Commission rescinded its 
resolution on December 11, 1996; the Board of Supervisors 
rescinded Resolution 96-10 on December 18, 1996. 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment on behalf 
of the Township defendants on the S 1983 claims. The court 
held the ban was not a violation of the First Amendment 
because it was a reasonable time, place, and manner 
restriction and dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim 
because the Township's conduct did not constitute a 
substantive due process violation. The court also 
determined that plaintiff 's request for injunctive relief was 
moot. After disposing of the federal claims, the District 
Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
plaintiff 's state law claims or the Township's claim against 
Snyder. See Whiteland Woods v. Township of West 
Whiteland, No. 96-CV-8086, 1997 WL 653906, at *4-*8 




The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary review of a grant of summary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Initially, Whiteland Woods also sought relief based on the failure of 
the 
Board of Supervisors and Planning Commission to rescind promptly the 
unenforceable resolutions. The District Court rejected that theory and 
Whiteland Woods does not press it on appeal. 
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judgment. See Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corp. , 142 F.3d 
690, 696 (3d Cir. 1998). We view all evidence and draw all 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party and grant summary judgment if no 
reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. See 







The primary issue on appeal is whether there is a federal 
constitutional right to videotape public meetings of a 
township planning commission when other effective means 
of recording the proceedings are available. "It is now well 
established that the Constitution protects the right to 
receive information and ideas." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564 (1969). Because a "major purpose of[the First] 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs," Globe Newspaper v. Superior Ct., 457 
U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
the public and press have the right to attend certain types 
of governmental proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 603 (criminal 
trials); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 
1067-1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (civil trials). 
 
We have no hesitation in holding Whiteland Woods had a 
constitutional right of access to the Planning Commission 
meeting on October 9, 1996. Whether the public has a First 
Amendment right of access to a particular government 
proceeding depends on "two complementary 
considerations." Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 
F.2d 1164, 1174 (3d Cir. 1986). First, "because a tradition 
of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of 
experience," we must consider "whether the place and 
process has historically been open to the press and general 
public." Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 
478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Second, we evaluate "whether public access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular 
process in question." Id. In the context of judicial 
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proceedings, we have identified six factors pertinent to the 
application of the second prong: 
 
       [1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental 
       affairs by providing the public with the more complete 
       understanding of the judicial system; [2] promotion of 
       the public perception of fairness which can be achieved 
       only by permitting full public view of the proceedings; 
       [3] providing a significant community therapeutic value 
       as an outlet for community concern, hostility and 
       emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt practices by 
       exposing the judicial process to public scrutiny;[5] 
       enhancement of the performance of all involved; and[6] 
       discouragement of perjury." 
 
United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(bracketed numbers in original). 
 
Public access to Township Planning Commission 
Meetings is guaranteed by the Pennsylvania Municipalities 
Planning Code of 1968 S 209(10), 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
S 10209(10) (West 1998), and by the Sunshine Act of 1986, 
53 Pa. Stat. Ann. SS 271-86, see Moore v. Township of 
Raccoon, 625 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). 
Although the Planning Commission serves in an advisory 
capacity only, see Heck v. Zoning Hearing Bd. , 397 A.2d 15, 
19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979), "[t]he General Assembly . . . 
intended that planning commissions play an active role in 
all aspects of municipal development and land use." Moore, 
625 A.2d at 739. Public access to the Commission's 
meetings complies with the standards set forth in Capital 
Cities and advances the interests identified in Simone. 
Public awareness of land use matters and the perception of 
fairness are fostered by the presence of affected members of 
the township at Commission meetings. Participants in these 
meetings, whether members of the Commission or 
witnesses providing testimony, are put on notice that their 
actions will be evaluated by the community. Consequently, 
we believe the Planning Commission meetings are precisely 
the type of public proceeding to which the First Amendment 
guarantees a public right of access. 
 
But the public's right of access is not absolute. In holding 
that a criminal trial may not be completely closed to the 
public, the Supreme Court emphasized, 
 
                                8 
  
       [O]ur holding today does not mean that the First 
       Amendment rights of the public and representatives of 
       the press are absolute. Just as a government may 
       impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
       upon the use of its streets in the interest of such 
       objectives as the free flow of traffic, so may a trial 
       judge, in the interest of the fair administration of 
       justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a 
       trial. "[T]he question in a particular case is whether 
       that control is exerted so as not to deny or 
       unwarrantedly abridge . . . the opportunities for the 
       communication of thought and the discussion of public 
       questions immemorially associated with resort to 
       public places." 
 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 
n.18 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Cox v. New 
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941)) (citations omitted); 
see also id. at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring); Globe 
Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 607 n.17. The Supreme Court also 
found no constitutional violation in the denial of a press 
request for access to county jail facilities for the purpose of 
investigating conditions in the jail, noting it had"never 
intimated a First Amendment guarantee of a right of access 
to all sources of information within government control" 
and that the "undoubted right to gather news . . . affords 
no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels 
others--private persons or governments--to supply 
information." Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9, 11 
(1978) (plurality opinion). Thus, the First Amendment does 
not require unfettered access to government information. 
 
The District Court analyzed Whiteland Woods' First 
Amendment claim under the traditional public forum  
doctrine.2 See Whiteland Woods, 1997 WL 653906, at *6. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government's ability to restrict speech is limited in speech fora. 
 
       The Court has identified three types of fora: the traditional 
public 
       forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the 
       nonpublic forum. Traditional public fora are defined by the 
objective 
       characteristics of the property, such as whether, by long tradition 
or 
       by government fiat, the property has been devoted to assembly and 
       debate. . . . 
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The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also 
analyzed prohibitions on recordings of public proceedings 
under standards similar to those applied to time, place, and 
manner restrictions on speech in a public forum. See 
Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(per curiam) (denying summary judgment to defendants for 
prohibiting audio recording of the Alabama Supreme Court 
Advisory Committee on Child Support Guidelines because 
plaintiffs alleged a non-content-neutral prohibition); United 
States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(upholding prohibition on videotaping, photographing, and 
radio broadcasting in the courtroom). In contrast, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        Designated public fora, in contrast, are created by purposeful 
       governmental action. The government does not create a designated 
       public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but 
only 
       by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public 
       discourse. . . . 
 
        Other government properties are either nonpublic fora or not fora 
       at all. 
 
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) 
(citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Time, 
place, and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum are 
permissible "provided [1] the restrictions are justified without reference 
to the content of the regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly 
tailored 
to serve a significant governmental interest, and[3] that they leave open 
ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Restrictions on speech in a non-public forum must be 
reasonable and content-neutral. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 
523 U.S. at 677-78. 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court has discussed "limited" public fora, 
which are designated for expression, but only on limited topics. See, 
e.g., 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
Although there is some uncertainty whether limited public fora are a 
subset of designated public fora or a type of nonpublic fora, see 
Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 914-15 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(discussing cases), we have generally applied to limited public fora the 
constitutional requirements applicable to designated public fora. See 
Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 
F.3d 
242, 248-55 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Second Circuits have 
required only that restrictions on videotaping or 
audiotaping be content-neutral and reasonable, the 
standards applied to speech in a nonpublic forum. See 
United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 
1985) (upholding exclusion of television cameras from 
criminal trial); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 747 
F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1984) (upholding ban on audiotape 
recording of civil trial). 
 
We are not convinced that forum analysis is necessary to 
resolve such restrictions on the right of access. 
Traditionally, the speech forum doctrine applies to 
"expressive" or "speech" activity. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. 
Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discussing 
a public forum as a place for "expressive activity"); Brody v. 
Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme 
Court has adopted a framework of forum analysis to assess 
whether a government entity must permit speech or 
expressive activity on its property."). Whiteland Woods does 
not allege the Township interfered with its speech or other 
expressive activity. Rather, the alleged constitutional 
violation consisted of a restriction on Whiteland Woods' 
right to receive and record information. In a similar context, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found forum 
analysis inapplicable to CNN's attempt to televise a libel 
trial: 
 
       [I]t has never been suggested that there is a link 
       between the First Amendment interest that a litigant 
       has in his trial as a "form of expression" and the right 
       that the public may have to view that expression on 
       television. Whatever public forum interest may exist in 
       litigation, that interest is clearly a speaker's interest, 
       not an interest in access to the courtroom. Because the 
       ability of neither General Westmoreland nor CBS to 
       express views at trial is altered by the presence or 
       absence of television cameras, CNN's public forum 
       argument is, by itself, inapposite. 
 
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. , 752 F.2d 
16, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1984). Westmoreland was decided three 
days after Yonkers Board of Education, which, as noted, 
evaluated a ban on audio recording using criteria similar to 
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those governing restrictions on expressive speech in a 
nonpublic forum. See 747 F.2d at 114 (upholding the ban 
because it was content-neutral and reasonable). Although 
the two panels applied somewhat different tests to the 
similar questions before them, their analyses are 
consistent. The critical question regarding a content-neutral 
restriction on the time, place, or manner of access to a 
government proceeding is whether the restriction 
meaningfully interferes with the public's ability to inform 
itself of the proceeding: that is, whether it limits the 
underlying right of access rather than regulating the 
manner in which that access occurs. 
 
In this case, Whiteland Woods' right of access to the 
October 9 Planning Commission meeting was not 
meaningfully restricted by the ban on videotaping. The 
Township did not curtail Whiteland Woods' ability to 
express its views before the Planning Commission or to 
compile an accurate record of the proceedings. Nor did it 
prohibit interested parties, reporters, or members of the 
public from attending the meetings or limit the gathering of 
information by means other than by videotaping. Spectators 
were free to take notes, use audio recording devices, or 
even employ stenographic recording. Nothing in the record 
suggests videotaping would have provided a uniquely 
valuable source of information about Planning Commission 
meetings. The First Amendment does not require states to 
accommodate every potential method of recording its 
proceedings, particularly where the public is granted 
alternative means of compiling a comprehensive record. See 
Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 
818, 821 (10th Cir. 1982) (upholding ban on television 
coverage of court-ordered negotiations over electoral 
redistricting where members of the press were permitted to 
attend the meetings and take notes); Garrette v. Estelle, 556 
F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding prison's 
prohibition on filming execution because there were other 
methods of informing the public of the execution); Johnson 
v. Adams, 629 F. Supp. 1563, 1564-65 (E.D. Tex. 1986) 
(holding county commissioners may ban video recording of 
meetings where audiotaping was permitted). To put it 
another way, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an essential 
nexus between the right of access and a right to videotape 
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the Planning Commission proceedings. See Westmoreland, 
752 F.2d at 23 ("There is a long leap . . . between a public 
right under the First Amendment to attend trials and a 
public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial 
televised."). Accordingly, we believe Whiteland Woods has 
failed to demonstrate any deprivation of its First 
Amendment rights. 
 
Whiteland Woods relies primarily on Cable News 
Network, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 
518 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ga. 1981), in which the court 
considered restrictions on the press coverage of presidential 
activities. When only limited numbers of media 
representatives could be admitted to a given event, the 
Reagan administration admitted a media "pool" including a 
single television camera crew, which shared its feed with 
others seeking to cover the event. Traditionally, the pool 
representative had rotated among the three established 
television networks: ABC, CBS, and NBC. When CNN 
sought to be included in the rotation, the administration 
announced that television representatives would be banned 
from pooled coverage unless the four networks agreed 
among themselves to a pool rotation system. In striking 
down this restriction, the court found that television 
coverage of these events had traditionally been permitted, 
that such coverage provided information qualitatively 
different from that available through print media, and that 
the administration's motive was to avoid designating 
members of the pool rather than terminate press coverage. 
See id. at 1244-45. Because none of these factors is present 
here, we believe Cable News Network is inapposite.3 
 
We conclude that Whiteland Woods' right of access to 
Planning Commission meetings did not create a federal 
constitutional right to videotape the meetings. Whiteland 
Woods was allowed to attend all the meetings of the 
Planning Commission, including the October 9 session, and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Whiteland Woods also cites Maurice River Township Bd. of Educ. v. 
Maurice River Township Teachers Ass'n, 455 A.2d 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1982) (holding that the public had the right to videotape school 
board meetings). But that decision was based on New Jersey common 
law, not the First Amendment. See id. at 564. 
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to compile a full record of the proceedings, whether by 
written and stenographic notes or audiotaping. Therefore, 





Whiteland Woods also claims the Township violated its 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights 
when Officer Curran informed its representatives they could 
not videotape the October 9, 1996 meeting. Whiteland 
Woods does not base its claim on an alleged infringement 
of its fundamental rights under the First Amendment but 
instead on "what is arguably the most frightening and 
egregious abuse of governmental power which is the illegal 
deprivation of liberty by a municipal government through 
the raw use of its police force." (Appellant's Br. at 26.) 
 
We have recently reviewed the substantive limitations 
imposed by the due process clause on executive action 
such as police conduct: 
 
       "The touchstone of due process is the protection of the 
       individual against arbitrary action of government." . . . 
       [W]here abusive action by a member of the executive 
       branch is alleged, "only the most egregious official 
       conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the 
       constitutional sense." To generate liability, executive 
       action must be so ill-conceived or malicious that it 
       "shocks the conscience." 
 
Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 374-75 (3d Cir. 
1999) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
District Court found that this standard had not been met: 
"The police officer was requiring compliance with a duly- 
enacted resolution the Planning Commission believed was 
in the best interest of the public . . . . [A] police officer's 
verbal instruction to comply with the law does not, without 
more, amount to `arbitrary action of government.' " 
Whiteland Woods, 1997 WL 653906, at *7 (quoting Wolff, 
418 U.S. at 558). We agree. In requiring compliance with 
the resolution, Officer Curran was acting in a rational 
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manner. Contending that violation of the resolution was not 
a criminal offense, Whiteland Woods suggests that if the 
Township thought plaintiff's actions were illegal, "the 
appropriate thing to do would have been to seek redress 
through the Court--not through enforcement by an armed 
policeman." Plaintiff cites no authority for this position, nor 
does it explain how Curran's conduct rises to the level of a 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment. 
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